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Abstract
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical
model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertex. The cost of traversing an edge
depends on the number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the fact that different users may use
a resource at different times and for different durations, which plays an important role in defining the
costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmitting packets in a communication network, routing
traffic in a road network, or processing a task in a production system, the traversal of the network involves
an inherent delay, and so sharing and congestion of resources crucially depends on time.
We study timed network games, which add a time component to network games. Each vertex v in
the network is associated with a cost function, mapping the load on v to the price that a player pays
for staying in v for one time unit with this load. In addition, each edge has a guard, describing time
intervals in which the edge can be traversed, forcing the players to spend time on vertices. Unlike earlier
work that add a time component to network games, the time in our model is continuous and cannot be
discretized. In particular, players have uncountably many strategies, and a game may have uncountably
many pure Nash equilibria. We study properties of timed network games with cost-sharing or congestion
cost functions: their stability, equilibrium inefficiency, and complexity. In particular, we show that the
answer to the question whether we can restrict attention to boundary strategies, namely ones in which
edges are traversed only at the boundaries of guards, is mixed.
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1 Introduction
Network games (NGs, for short) [9, 38, 39] constitute a well studied model of non-cooperative games.
The game is played among selfish players on a network, which is a directed graph. Each player has a
source and a target vertex, and a strategy is a choice of a path that connects these two vertices. The
cost of a player is the sum of costs of the edges her path traverses, where a cost of an edge depends
on the load on it, namely the number of players using the edge. We distinguish between two types of
costs. In cost-sharing games (a.k.a. network formation games), each edge has a cost and the players
that use it split the cost among them, thus the load has a positive effect on cost. For example, when
the costs correspond to prices, users that share a resource also share its price. Then, in congestion
games, the load has a negative effect on cost: each edge has a non-decreasing latency function that
maps the load on the edge to its cost given this load. For example, when the network models a road
system and costs correspond to the traversal time, an increased load on an edge corresponds to a
traffic jam, increasing the cost of the players that use it.
One limitation of NGs is that the cost of using a resource abstracts the fact that different users
may use the resource at different times and for different durations. This is a real limitation, as time
plays an important role in many real-life settings. For example, in a road or communication systems,
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congestion only affects cars or messages that use a road or a channel simultaneously. We are interested
in settings in which congestion affects the QoS or the way a price is shared (rather than the travel
time). For example, discomfort increases in a crowded train or price is shared by the passengers in
a taxi without affecting the travel time. Similarly, in mobile networks, the call quality depends on
the number of subscribers using the network simultaneously. As a third example, when processing
a task in a production system, jobs move from one station to another. The way the cost of running
the stations is shared by the jobs that use it depends on the time spent in the stations and on the
synchronization among the jobs.
We introduce and study timed network games (TNGs, for short) – a new model that adds a time
component on NGs. Similar to NGs, the game is played on a network and the players need to find
a path from their source to target vertices. Rather than paying for the traversal of edges, in TNGs
the players pay for spending time in vertices. Each edge in the network has a guard, which is a
disjunction of time intervals that specifies when an edge can be traversed. Traversing an edge is done
instantaneously. So, a strategy for a player is a timed path: a sequence of pairs 〈v, t〉 of a vertex v
and the time t spent on v. When the path traverses an edge in the network, the guard of the edge
must be satisfied. For an integer k ∈ IN, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Each vertex v has a cost function
rv : [k]→ IR≥0 that assigns the cost of using v for one time unit, given the load in v. A profile in a
TNG is then a vector of timed paths, namely the strategies of all players. Given a profile P , the cost
of each player is induced by the cost functions of the vertices visited in her timed path, the time spent
at each vertex, and the load on the vertices during these visits.
I Example 1. Consider an automobile service center with three stations: (s) tuning engine, (a) tire
and air check, and (w) dry and wet wash. The costs for operating the stations per one time unit are
8, 4 and 6 respectively, and they are independent of the number of cars served. Accordingly, cost is
shared by the users. There are two billing counters, u1 and u2, for dropped-in and registered cars.
The setting is modeled by the TNG below. As described in the TNG, after spending some time in s,
the cars can alternate between stations w and a. Assume that there are
two players, and consider the profile P in which the first player
chooses the timed path (s, 3), (a, 7), u1 and the second player chooses
the timed path (s, 3), (a, 4), (w, 3), u2. Player 1’s cost in P is
8/2·3+4/2·4+4·3 = 32 and Player 2’s cost is 8/2·3+4/2·4+6·3 =
38. Another possible profile in this game is P ′, in which the strategies
of the two players are (s, 3), (w, 4), (a, 3), u1 and (s, 3), (w, 7), u2.
Now, the costs are 36 and 42, respectively. J
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There has been reference to time already in early work on flow networks [27]. Research spans
from pioneering and theoretical work on flow networks in which congestion leads to queues (c.f.,
[42, 43]) to nowadays practical research on traffic engineering in software defined networks [2].
These works, however, do not address the problem from a game-theoretic perspective. To the best
of our knowledge, the first works to consider network games with a time component are [37] and
[29]. In [37], the focus is still on flow networks, and it enriches [42, 43] by viewing infinitesimal flow
particles as selfish agents (see also [16]). Closer to our work, network games with time components
where studied in [29, 32, 36]. These models differ from our model in two main aspects. First, the
cost a player pays in these models is the time it takes to reach its destination, and our cost represents
the QoS. Second, time is discrete in these models so the set of strategies the players choose is finite,
whereas the source of the difficulty of our model is the real-time and the fact that the players have
uncountably many strategies. The closest to our model is a model studied in [29], which studies a
QoS pricing but using discrete time.
Our model of TNGs is the first to add real-time considerations to the strategies of the players.
Indeed, a strategy for a player is not just the path of edges she is going to traverse, but also the time
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spent in vertices, which can be any number in IR≥0. Thus, even if we restrict attention to simple paths,
each player has uncountably many strategies. This continuous time and the richness of strategies
that it brings with it is also a key difference between TNGs and NGs. Our model is inspired by
timed automata [5]. There too, time is continuous, transitions between states are guarded by time
constraints, and so is the time spent in a state. There are typically uncountably many runs of a timed
automaton, corresponding to the uncountably many strategies a player typically has in our TNGs.
The fact timed automata handle continuous time makes them the prominent formalism for specifying
real-time on-going behaviors, and they are way more useful than formalisms in which time has been
discretized (c.f., temporal logic with discrete clocks [24], or the fictitious-clock approach of [28]).
We note that our TNGs correspond to a restricted class of timed automata, as our guards refer to the
global time and cannot express, for example, a bound on the time spent in a vertex. In Section 7 we
discuss the extension of our model to a richer one.
Note that, as in the time-dependent cost model of [29], load does not affect travel time and only
affects the cost. Unlike [29], in TNGs time is continuous, which enables TNGs to model richer
settings in practice. Note also that the cost function may model various applications. Consider, for
example, a communication network with servers that encode or decode messages. A typical cost
function for a server is the inverse of the quality of the signal, which is related to the number of bits
needed to encode a message. Assuming that a server can handle a certain amount of data per unit
time, this cost is the reciprocal of the number of bits used to encode a message. If the server allows a
16-bit encoding of a message when it serves less than 128 users simultaneously, and allows an 8-bit
encoding when it serves between 128 and 256 users simultaneously, then the cost function maps x to
1
16 , for x ≤ 128, and to 18 , for 129 ≤ x ≤ 256, reflecting a better quality of the received message
when load goes below 128 [34].
The first question that arises in the context of games is the existence of stable outcomes of the
game. In the context of NGs, the most prominent stability concept is that of a (pure) Nash equilibrium
(NE, for short) – a profile such that no player can decrease her cost by unilaterally deviating from
her current strategy1. Decentralized decision-making may lead to solutions that are sub-optimal
from the point of view of society as a whole. The standard measures to quantify the inefficiency
incurred due to selfish behavior is the price of stability (PoS) [9] and the price of anarchy (PoA)
[31]. In both measures we compare against a social optimum (SO, for short), namely a profile that
minimizes the sum of costs of all players. The PoS (PoA, respectively) is the best-case (worst-case)
inefficiency of an NE; that is, the ratio between the cost of a best (worst) NE and an SO. In Example
1, profile P is an SO, and is also a (best) NE, while profile P ′ is a worst NE. Note that there can
be uncountably many NEs in the TNG in Example 1. Indeed, for all t ∈ [3, 4], the profile Pt with
the strategies (s, 3), (a, t), (w, 4 − t)(a, 3)u1 and (s, 3), (a, t), (w, 7 − t)u2, is an NE with costs
8/2 · 3 + 4/2 · t+ 6/2 · (4− t) + 4 · 3 = 36− t and 8/2 · 3 + 4/2 · t+ 6/2 · (4− t) + 6 · 3 = 42− t.
The picture of stability and equilibrium inefficiency for standard NGs is well understood. Every
NG has an NE, and in fact these games are potential games [38], thus every sequence of best response
moves, namely moves that the players perform in order to reduce their costs, converges to an NE. For
k-player cost-sharing NGs, the PoS and PoA are log k and k, respectively [9]. For congestion games
with affine cost functions, PoS ≈ 1.577 [22, 3] and PoA = 52 [23].
The fact a TNG has uncountably many profiles makes the adoption of results known for NGs
questionable. Let us elaborate on this point. Consider a TNG T , and a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time
points. Note that there are only finitely many T -profiles in T (that is, profiles with T -strategies,
in which all edges are taken at some time point in T ). We show that once we restrict attention to
T -profiles, we can construct an NG that is isomorphic to T , in the sense that there is a cost-preserving
1 Throughout this paper, we consider pure strategies, as is the case for the vast literature on cost-sharing games.
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bijection between profiles in the NG and T -profiles in the TNG T . While this enables us to reduce
questions about T -profiles in the TNG to questions on NGs, it is not clear to which finite set T
we can restrict attention. In the setting of timed automata, much work has been done on obtaining
decidability by partitioning IR≥0 into finitely many regions. Essentially, all time points within a
region are bisimilar, in the sense that the actions the automaton may take inside all time points in
a region, coincide [5]. Our challenge here is similar: searching for a finite set of time points that
partitions IR≥0 to finitely many intervals.
Recall that the source for delays in TNGs are time guards on the edges, where each guard is
a disjunction of intervals [a, b], for a ≤ b ∈ Q≥0. We refer to the two end points of all guards as
boundaries. One can suspect that we can restrict attention to boundary strategies, namely timed paths
that traverse edges only at boundary time points, and boundary profiles in which all the players choose
boundary strategies. We show that the situation is mixed. The good news follows from choosing T
above to be the boundaries, thus we show that a boundary NE and SO exist and an NE can be found
by performing best-response moves that use only boundary strategies. Unfortunately, however, one
cannot restrict attention to boundary profiles, as the best and worst NEs need not be boundary. We
show a best and worst NE is attained in TNGs, which is not a-priori guaranteed.
In terms of inefficiency, the reduction from TNGs to isomorphic NGs enables us to extend upper
bounds on the PoS and PoA from NGs to TNGs. The adoption of lower bounds requires a reduction
in the other direction – from NGs to TNGs, which we can show only for acyclic NGs. Consequently,
we can apply only lower bounds known for acyclic NGs, which forces us to either prove direct bounds
or to tighten lower bounds known for NGs to acyclic NGs. All in all, we are able to show that the PoS
and PoA coincide for NGs and TNGs, except for the lower bound on the PoS of congestion TNGs,
which we leave open. Finally, in terms of computational complexity, we prove that the problem of
finding an NE is PLS-complete [30] for TNGs, which coincides with the complexity bounds for
NGs [25, 41]. Proving membership in PLS follows easily from the reduction from TNGs to NGs.
Proving hardness is more complex. For congestion TNGs, we are able to rely on known hardness
results for congestion NGs, as they apply already for acyclic congestion NGs [1]. For cost-sharing
TNGs we need a similar reduction from acyclic cost-sharing NGs, whose precise complexity is an
open problem. Accordingly, we first settle the latter problem and prove that finding an NE in acyclic
cost-sharing NG is PLS-hard, which allows us to prove the hardness result for cost-sharing TNGs.
Due to lack of space, some proofs appear in the full version, which can be found in the authors’
homepages.
2 Preliminaries
We describe a (closed) time interval by [m1,m2], for m1,m2 ∈ IR≥0. We refer to m1 and m2 as
the start and the end interval boundaries, respectively. A guard is the constant true or a disjunction
of time intervals. A point in time t ∈ IR≥0 satisfies a guard g if g is true or g includes a disjunct
[m1,m2] such that m1 ≤ t ≤ m2.
A timed network (TN) is a tuple 〈V,E, {ge}e∈E〉, where V is a set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is a
set of directed edges, and for each edge e ∈ E, the guard ge specifies the time intervals during which
e may be traversed. A timed network game (TNG) is T = 〈k, V,E, {ge}e∈E , {rv}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉,
where k is the number of players; 〈V,E, {ge}e∈E〉 is a timed network; for v ∈ V , the cost function
rv : [k]→ IR≥0 maps the load on vertex v, namely the number of players that simultaneously visit
vertex v, to the cost each of them pays for staying in v for one time unit with this load; and for i ∈ [k],
the pair 〈si, ui〉 ∈ V × V describes the objective of Player i: choosing a timed path from si to ui. A
timed network game is symmetric if all the players have the same objective, i.e. the same source and
target pair. We use B(T ) to denote the set of interval boundaries appearing in the guards of T .
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In order to satisfy her objective, Player i has to choose a path in T from si to ui as well as the
duration spent in each vertex in the path. Indeed, while edges are traversed instantaneously, the guards
on the edges force the players to spend time on vertices. Each player then aims to minimize the cost
of these stays. In order to formally define the strategies of the players and their costs, we first need
some definitions.
A timed path in the TNG T is a sequence pi = 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn ∈ (V × IR≥0)∗ · V ,
such that for all 0 ≤ i < n, we have that 〈vj , vj+1〉 ∈ E; that is, v0, . . . , vn is a path in the graph
〈V,E〉. Intuitively, for all 0 ≤ i < n, we have that tj describes the time spent in the vertex vj before
the path continues to vj+1. Let τ0 = t0 and τj = τj−1 + tj , for 0 < j < n. Note that τj =
∑j
l=0 tl.
Thus, τj is the time that has elapsed since the traversal of pi starts and until pi leaves the vertex vj .
We sometimes refer to pi also as the sequence 〈τ0, e1〉, . . . , 〈τn−1, en〉 ∈ (IR≥0 × E)∗, where for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that ej = 〈vj−1, vj〉 is the j-th edge in pi and is taken at time τj−1. We say that
the timed path pi is legal if for all 0 ≤ j < n, we have that τj satisfies the guard gej+1 .
A strategy for a player with an objective 〈s, u〉 is a legal timed path pi = 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn
such that v0 = s and vn = u. Consider a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time points. We say that the strategy
pi is a T -strategy if all edges in pi are taken at times in T . Formally, for all 0 ≤ j < n, we have that
τj ∈ T . A profile is a tuple P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 of strategies for the players. That is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
we have that pii is a strategy for Player i. A profile is a T -profile if all its strategies are T -strategies.
Of special interest are boundary strategies and profiles, namely T -strategies and T -profiles for
T = B(T ). Note that each profile P has a finite minimal set T ⊆ IR≥0 such that P is a T -profile.
We denote this set by TP .
Given T ⊆ IR≥0, let tmax = max(T ). Also, for t ∈ T such that t 6= tmax, let nextT (t) be the
time point t′ ∈ T such that t < t′ and there is no t′′ ∈ T such that t < t′′ < t′. That is, nextT (t) is
the time point successor to t in T . We can partition the interval [0, tmax] to a set Υ of sub-intervals
[m1,m2] such that m1 and m2 are in T ∪ {0}, and m2 = nextT (m1). We refer to the sub-intervals
in Υ as periods. When T is TP for some profile P , then the set Υ is the coarsest partition of [0, tmax]
into periods such that no player crosses an edge within each period. We denote this partition by ΥP .
Consider a T -profile P . For a player i ∈ [k] and a period γ ∈ ΥP , let visitsP (i, γ) be the vertex
that Player i visits during period γ. That is, if pii = 〈vi0, ti0〉, . . . , 〈vini−1, tini−1〉, vini is the legal timed
path that is the strategy for Player i and γ = [m1,m2], then visitsP (i, γ) is the vertex vij for the
index 1 ≤ j < ni such that τ ij−1 ≤ m1 ≤ m2 ≤ τ ij . Note that since P is a T -profile, then for each
period γ = [m1,m2] ∈ ΥP , the number of players that stay in each vertex v during γ is fixed. Let
loadP (v, γ) denote this number. Formally loadP (v, γ) = |{i : visitsP (i, γ) = v}|. Finally, for a
period γ = [m1,m2], let |γ| = m2 −m1 be the duration of γ.
Recall that the cost function rv : [k] −→ IR≥0 maps the load of v to the cost of v per time unit.
Accordingly, if visitsP (i, γ) = v, then the cost of Player i in P over the period γ is costγ,i(P ) =
rv(loadP (v, γ)) · |γ|. We distinguish between two types of cost functions. We say that in uniform cost-
sharing games (CS-TNGs, for short), the players that visit a vertex share its cost equally. Formally,
each vertex v is associated with a rate bv ∈ IR≥0, and for all l ≥ 1, we have rv(l) = bvl . Note
that increasing the load in uniform cost-sharing games decreases the cost of the players. On the
other hand, in congestion games (CON-TNGs, for short), the cost functions are non-decreasing, thus
increasing the load also increases the cost for each player. The total cost of Player i in profile P is
then costi(P ) =
∑
γ∈ΥP costγ,i(P ). The cost of the profile P , denoted cost(P ), is the total cost
incurred by all the players, i.e., cost(P ) =
∑k
i=1 costi(P ).
Consider a TNG T . For a profile P and a strategy pi of player i ∈ [k], let P [i← pi] denote the
profile obtained from P by replacing the strategy for Player i by pi. A profile P is said to be a (pure)
Nash equilibrium (NE) if none of the players in [k] can benefit from a unilateral deviation from her
strategy in P to another strategy. In other words, for every player i and every strategy pi that Player i
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can deviate to from her current strategy in P , it holds that costi(P [i← pi]) ≥ costi(P ). The set of
NEs of the game T is denoted by NE(T ).
A social optimum (SO) of a game T is a profile that attains the infimum cost over all profiles. We
denote by SO(T ) the cost of an SO profile; i.e., SO(T ) = infP cost(P ). Note that since a TNG
may have infinitely many profiles, we should indeed take the infimum (rather than minimum) over all
profiles, and thus, an SO profile may not exist. As we shall show, however, all TNGs have boundary
SO profiles. An SO profile may be achieved by a centralized authority and need not be an NE. The
following parameters measure the inefficiency caused as a result of the selfish interests of the players.
First, the price of stability (PoS) [8] of a timed network game T is the ratio between the infimum cost
of an NE and the cost of a social optimum of T . That is, PoS(T ) = inf P∈NE(T )cost(P )/SO(T ).
Then, the price of anarchy (PoA) [35] of T is the ratio between the supremum cost of an NE and the
cost of a social optimum of T . That is, PoA(T ) = supP∈NE(T )cost(P )/SO(T ). Note that here
too, we have to use infimum and supremum rather than minimum and maximum, yet we are going to
show that best and worst NEs are always attained. For a family F of games, we say that the PoA of
F is at most x if for all games F in F , we have PoA(F ) ≤ x and is at least x, if there exists a game
F in F such that PoA(F ) = x, and similarly for PoS.
3 Reduction to and from Network Games
A network game (NG) is N = 〈k, V,E, {le}e∈E , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉, and has a similar structure to a TNG.
A strategy of a player i ∈ [k] is a path from si to ui. The cost function le : [k] → IR≥0 maps
the load on edge e to the cost each player pays for using e. As is the case with TNGs, one can
consider both cost-sharing (CS-NGs) and congestion (CON-NGs) network games. Consider a profile
P = 〈σ1, σ2, . . . , σk〉 in the game. Since all the costs are positive, we can restrict attention to
strategies in which the paths chosen by the players are simple. Then, we can also ignore the order
between the edges in the paths and assume that for all i ∈ [k], we have that σi ⊆ E is a set of edges
that composes a path from si to ui.2 For an edge e ∈ E, we denote by loadP (e), the number of
players that use the edge e in P . Each player that uses e then pays le(loadP (e)), and the cost of
Player i in P is
∑
e∈σi le(loadP (e)).
Given an NG N , a TNG T and a finite set T ⊂ IR≥0, we say that N and T are isomorphic with
respect to T if N and T have the same number of players and there exists a 1-to-1 cost-preserving
correspondence between the profiles inN and the T -profiles in T . Formally, there exists a bijection f
from the set of T -profiles in T and the profiles in N such that for every T -profile P in T and i ∈ [k],
the costs of Player i in P and f(P ) coincide.
NGs have been extensively studied. In this section, we show that once we fix a set T ⊆ IR≥0 of
time points, we can reduce a TNG T with edges taken only at time points in T to an NG. Formally,
we have the following.
I Theorem 2. Given a TNG T and a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0, we can construct an NG N such that N
and T are isomorphic with respect to T . The size of N is polynomial in the size of T and T , and it is
constructed in polynomial time.
Proof. In TNGs, cost is associated with vertices and the time is spent in them, whereas in NGs, cost
is associated with the edges and there is no reference to time. Thus, the construction translates the
cost of staying in vertices during time intervals induced by T to the cost of traversing edges.
2 Note that the assumptions on each edge being visited at most once in strategies in NGs does not apply to TNGs.
Indeed, there, a player may benefit from visiting a vertex multiple times (see Example 1).
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Consider a TNG T = 〈k, V,E, {rv}v∈V , {ge}e∈E , (si, ui)i∈[k]〉 and the given set T . We
assume that 0 ∈ T . We construct an NG N = 〈k, V ′, E′, {le}e∈E′ , (〈si, 0〉, ui)i∈[k]〉, where V ′ ⊆
(V × T ) ∪ {ui}i∈[k] and E′ ⊆ V ′ × V ′ is defined as follows (See an example in the full version. For
every vertex v ∈ V , we have the following edges in E′. Let τmax = max(T ).
1. For every τ 6= τmax ∈ T , let τ ′ = nextT (τ). Then, the edge e = ((v, τ), (v, τ ′)) is in E′,
corresponding to players staying in vertex v during the interval [τ, τ ′]. Accordingly, the cost of e
is such that for every m ∈ [k], we have le(m) = rv(m)(τ ′ − τ).
2. For every v′ 6= v with (v, v′) ∈ E and τ ∈ T such that τ satisfies g〈v,v′〉, we have an edge
e = ((v, τ), (v′, τ)) in E′. This edge corresponds to the edge (v, v′) in E. Recall that the cost of
crossing an edge in a TNG is 0. Accordingly, the cost of e is such that for every m ∈ [k], we have
le(m) = 0.
3. If v = ui for some i ∈ [k], then for all τ ∈ T , we have an edge e = ((v, τ), v) in E′, with
le′(m) = 0 for every m ≥ 1. In N , the target vertex for Player i is ui.
It is easy to see that the size of N is polynomial in T and T . In the full version, we prove that
N and T are indeed isomorphic with respect to T . That is, we show a bijection f from the set of
T -profiles in T and the profiles in N such that for every T -profile P in T and i ∈ [k], the costs of
Player i in P and f(P ) coincide. J
A reduction in the other direction, namely of NGs to TNGs, is not obvious, as the dynamic of
TNGs requires a synchronization among all the traversals in each of the edges. We illustrate this in
the full version of the paper. When, however, the NG is acyclic, we can use a topological ordering
on the edges and synchronize the traversals. Intuitively, each edge in the NG induces a vertex in the
TNG, and the guards are defined so that the vertex associated with the j-th edge in the topological
order is visited during the period [j − 1, j]. This can be easily forced by guarding the edges entering
the vertex by [j − 1, j − 1] and guarding these that leave it by [j, j]. See the full version for the proof.
I Theorem 3. Given an acyclic NG N , we can construct in polynomial time a TNG T that is
isomorphic to N with respect to B(T ) ∪ {0}. The size of T is polynomial in the size of N .
4 On Boundary Strategies and Profiles
Since a strategy for a player in a TNG is a timed path with time points in IR≥0, then each player has
uncountably many possible strategies, and hence it is possible to have uncountably many profiles. In
NGs, a strategy is a non-timed path from the source to the target. Even there, in the non-timed setting,
there may be infinitely many paths from the source to the target. It is easy to see, however, that every
strategy that is a non-simple path is dominated by the strategy obtained by removing cycles, and thus
one can restrict attention to the finitely many profiles that consist of strategies that are simple paths.
Our goal in this section is to examine whether some similar restriction can be made in TNGs. Indeed,
being able to restrict attention to finitely many profiles would simplify our understanding of TNGs
and their analysis. A natural candidate is a restriction to boundary strategies, namely these in which
all edges are taken at interval boundaries. We show that while a boundary NE exists in all TNGs,
and that all TNGs have a boundary SO, there may be uncountably many NEs that are not boundary.
Moreover, there are TNGs in which the best and worst NEs are not boundary.
We first need the following lemma.
I Lemma 4. Consider a TNG T and a finite set T ⊂ IR≥0 such that B(T ) ⊆ T . Let pi1, . . . , pik−1
be T -strategies of players 1, . . . , k − 1 respectively. There exists a T -strategy pik of Player k such
that for every strategy pi′k of Player k that is not a T -strategy, we have costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik−1, pik〉) ≤
costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik−1, pi′k〉).
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Intuitively, Lemma 4 states that if all players but one use boundary strategies, then a best strategy
for the k-th player can also be a boundary one. It implies that when we want to prove that a certain
boundary profile is an NE, we can restrict attention to deviations that use boundary strategies.
I Theorem 5. All TNGs have a boundary NE. Moreover, from every profile P , there is a sequence
of best-response moves that converges to an NE. When P is boundary, so is the obtained NE.
Proof. Given a TNG T , let N be an NG that is isomorphic to T with respect to B(T ). Let f be
the bijection from the set of profiles in N to the set of B(T )-profiles in T such that for every profile
P in N and i ∈ [k], the costs of Player i in P and f(P ) coincide. By Theorem 2, such an NG and
bijection f exist. By [8, 25, 38], all NGs have an NE. Consider an NE PN in N . In the full version
we prove that f(PN ) is an NE in T .
For the second claim, the above considerations also imply that starting from a profile P , we can
restrict attention to best-response moves in which edges are taken in time points in TP ∪B(T ), and
reach the desired NE. In particular, when P is boundary, so is the obtained NE. J
Recall that an SO profile attains the infimum cost over all profiles. We now show that an SO profile
always exists, and in fact there always exists a boundary SO. We show that a boundary SO profile
always exists. The idea is that if, in a profile P , an edge e is taken at a non-boundary time τ , then it is
possible to obtain a profile P ′ in which e is taken at a boundary time and cost(P ′) ≤ cost(P ). We
formalize this intuition in the full version.
I Theorem 6. All TNGs have a boundary SO.
We proceed to show that there are non-trivial TNGs that have uncountably many NEs, which
implies they also have uncountably many non-boundary NEs.
I Theorem 7. There exist CS-TNGs and CON-TNGs that have uncountably many NEs.
Proof. The CS-TNG from Example 1 has uncountably many NEs. In the full version, we present
and analyze in detail a different CS-TNG with uncountably many NEs.
We continue to CON-TNGs. Consider the TNG appearing in Figure 1. The objectives of Players 1
and 2 is 〈a, d〉 and the objectives of Players 3 and 4 is 〈b, d〉. The cost functions are written in the
vertices. For y ∈ [0, 0.5], let Py be the profile in which Players 1 and 2 traverse the edge (a, b), and
Players 3 and 4 traverse the edge (b, c), all at time y. In the full version, we prove that for every
y ∈ [0, 0.5], the profile Py is an NE. Since y can have any value in [0, 0.5], we are done. J
Theorem 7 suggests that the values of a best and worst NEs should be defined by means of
infimum and supremum, and may not be attained. In the full version we prove that best and worst NEs
do exist. Essentially, it follows from the fact that our guards are closed intervals, implying that the
time points in an NE should satisfy a system of inequalities with no strict inequalities. As bad news,
we now show that while a boundary NE alway exists, the best and worst NEs need not be boundary.
I Theorem 8. There exists a CS-TNG in which the best NE is not a boundary profile.
Proof. Consider the two-player TNG N that is played on the network depicted in Figure 2. The
objective of Player i is 〈s, ui〉. Player 1 has two boundary strategies: A, in which she traverses the
edge 〈s, a〉 at time 0, and B, in which she takes it at time 2. Note that the suffixes of the strategies
are fixed, as Player 1 must traverse the edge 〈a, u1〉 at time 3. Player 2 has three boundary strategies:
Strategies A and B, in which she traverses edge 〈s, a〉 at time 0 and 2, respectively, and Strategy C, in
which she traverses the edge 〈s, b〉 at time 2. Again, the suffixes of the strategiesA andB are fixed. In
the full version, we prove that 〈A,A〉 and 〈B,C〉 are the only boundary NEs with cost(〈A,A〉) = 30
and cost(〈B,C〉) = 31− .
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For x ∈ (0, 2), let Px be the profile in which both players traverse the edge 〈s, a〉 at time 2− x.
In the full version, we show that we can define  and x so that Px is an NE with cost(Px) <
min{cost(〈A,A〉), cost(〈B,C〉)}. For example, by taking x = 0.25 and  = 0.5 we get an NE with
cost(Px) = 26.5 J
I Theorem 9. There exists a CS-TNG in which the worst NE is not a boundary profile.
Proof. Consider the two-player TNG N that is played on the network depicted in Figure 3. The
objective of Player i is 〈s, ui〉. Player 1 has three boundary strategies: A, in which she traverses the
edge (v1, v2) at time 0; B, in which she takes it at time 2; and D, in which she traverses the edge
(v1, v5) at time 2.
Player 2 has four boundary strategies: A, in which she traverses edge (v1, v2) at time 0; B, where
she takes (v1, v2) at time 2; C, where she traverses the edge (v1, v4) at time 2; and E, where she
traverses the edge (s, v3). Note that strategy E has a fixed cost of 13.2.
In the full version, we prove that the only boundary profile that is an NE is the profile 〈D,C〉,
whose cost is 26.3, and that the non-boundary profile P0.2 in which Players 1 and 2 traverse the edge
(v1, v2) together at time 1.8 is an NE with cost 26.4, which is higher than cost(〈D,C〉). J
I Theorem 10. There exists a CON-TNG in which the worst NE is not a boundary profile.
Proof. Recall the CON-TNG presented in Figure 1. In the proof of Theorem 7, we proved that for
all 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5, the profile Py , in which Players 1 and 2 traverse the edge (a, b) and Players 3 and 4
traverse the edge (b, c), all at time y, is an NE. We have cost1(Py) = cost2(Py) = 13y+10·(1−y) =
3y + 10, whereas cost3(Py) = cost4(Py) = 10y + 10 · (1− y) = 10. Thus cost(Py) = 6y + 40.
Players 1 and 2 have three boundary strategies: A, in which they traverse the edge (a, b) at time
0; B, in which they traverse the edge (a, b) at time 1; and C, in which they traverse the edge (a, g) at
time 0. Players 3 and 4 have three boundary strategies: D, in which they traverse the edge (b, c) at
time 0, and E, in which they traverse the edge (b, c) at time 1, and F , in which they traverse the edge
(b, d) at time 1.
In the full version, we show that the boundary NEs with the highest cost are 〈C,B,E,E〉 and
〈C,B, F, F 〉 having a cost of 42.5. The cost of the profile P0.5 is 6 · 0.5 + 40 = 43. This implies
that the worst NE in the CON-TNG in Figure 1 is a non-boundary profile. J
We note that it might appear that whenever there exists a non-boundary NE in a TNG T , there
exist uncountably many NEs in T . This, however, is not the case as can be seen in the TNG in Figure
3. As argued in the proof of Theorem 9, this TNG has only one non-boundary NE. We also note that
while we showed that the best and worst NEs in a CS-TNG need not be boundary, for congestion
games we only showed that the worst NE need not be boundary. Thus, the problem of whether there
is a CON-TNG in which the best NE is not boundary is left open.
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5 Equilibrium Inefficiency
As discussed in Section 1, decentralized decision-making often leads to solutions that are sub-optimal
from the point of view of the society as a whole. Recall that the measures PoS and PoA measure the
inefficiency caused by the selfish behavior of the players. It refers to the ratio between the best (PoS)
and worst (PoA) NEs and the SO. In this section we discuss these measures for TNGs. For NGs, the
PoS and PoA are well understood. In order to use Theorem 2 and apply the results known for NGs
to TNGs, we need to find a set of time points with respect to which the models are isomorphic. As
discussed in Section 4, the natural candidate for this is the set of interval boundaries. While, however,
we can restrict attention to boundary strategies when we consider the SO, such a restriction is not
sound when we consider the infimum and supremum values of NEs. We show that our results in
Theorem 2 and Section 4 do imply the required upper bounds, and that the lower bounds known for
NGs can be extended to TNGs by carefully revising the examples known there.
I Theorem 11. The PoS and PoA for TNGs are upper-bounded by these for NGs. Thus, for
CS-TNGs with k players, the PoS is at most log k and the PoA is at most k. For CON-TNGs with
affine cost functions, the PoS is at most 1.577 and the PoA is at most 52 .
Proof. Consider a TNG T . Let P be an NE in T and letNP be the NG isomorphic to T with respect
to B(T ) ∪ TP . Let f be a cost preserving bijection from the (B(T ) ∪ TP )-profiles of T and these
of NP . As argued in the proof of Theorem 5, the profile f(P ) is an NE in NP . It follows that the
cost of an NE in T is upper and lower bounded by the cost of an NE in an NG. Also, by Theorem 6,
there exists a boundary SO in T , which, by Theorem 2, corresponds to an SO in N . Thus, the ratio
between an NE in T and the cost of its SO is upper and lower bounded by this ratio in an NG. Since
the above holds for all TNGs, we are done. J
Adopting the lower bounds on PoS and PoA from NGs to TNGs is more difficult, as the reduction
from NGs to TNGs can be applied only to acyclic NGs. Fortunately, for CS-NGs, matching lower
bounds have been proven for acyclic networks. Hence, using considerations that are similar to these
in the proof of Theorem 11 (in fact, simpler ones, as there is no need to refer to TP ), we can use the
reduction described in Theorem 3 in order to conclude the following.
I Theorem 12. The PoS and PoA for TNGs are lower-bounded by these for acyclic NGs. Thus, for
CS-TNGs with k players, the PoS is at least log k and the PoA is at least k.
For CON-TNG, the adoption of results from CON-NGs is more challenging, as known lower
bounds use cyclic network. We are still able to prove a lower bound for the PoA. A bound for
CON-NGs with linear cost function has been shown in [22]. In our case, we show that the upper
bound is matched asymptotically as we increase the number of players k, where k ≥ 3.
I Theorem 13. There are CON-TNGs with linear cost functions such that for k=3 or more players,
the PoA is 5·k2(k−2)+3+5 . Hence as k →∞, the PoA approaches 52 .
Proof. Consider the three-player CON-TNG appearing in Figure 4. The sources and targets of the
three players are s1, s2, s3 and u1, u2, u3, respectively. The cost of staying in the source vertices is
0. For the rest of the vertices, the cost functions are as follows: rv1(x) = rv4(x) = 2x, rv2(x) =
rv3(x) = x, rv5(x) = 3x, rv′1(x) = rv′2(x) = rv′3(x) = x, and rv′4(x) = 2x.
Consider the profile P in which Player i, for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, visits the vertices vi, vi+1, v′i. The
profile P is an NE in which each player pays 5, so cost(P ) = 15. However, an SO is obtained when
each Player i moves from her source to target through vertices vi+2, v′i+1. In this profile, the costs of
the players are 2, 3, and 5. Thus PoA = 152+3+5 =
3
2 .
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If there are k players, we consider the game with vertices v1, . . . , vk+2 and vertices v′1, . . . , v
′
k+1.
The cost functions are rv1(x) = rvk+1(x) = rv′k+1(x) = 2x, rvk+2(x) = 3x, while for the remaining
vertices v apart from the source and the target vertices, rv(x) = x. The PoA is 5·k2(k−2)+3+5 . Hence,
PoA asymptotically reaches its upper bound as k tends to∞. J
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6 The Complexity of Finding an NE
The complexity class PLS contains local search problems with polynomial time searchable neighbor-
hoods [30]. Essentially, a problem is in PLS if there is a set of feasible solutions for it such that it is
possible to find, in polynomial time, an initial feasible solution and then iteratively improve it, with
each improvement being performed in polynomial time, until a local optimum is reached. See the full
version for the formal definition.
In this section we prove that the problem of finding an NE is PLS-complete for TNGs, which
coincides with the complexity bounds for NGs [25, 41]. Proving membership in PLS would follow
easily from the reduction to NGs. Proving hardness is more involved: While for CON-TNGs we are
able to rely on previous results, corresponding to CS-TNGs, we first solve the problem for acyclic
CS-NGs. We start with the upper bound.
I Theorem 14. The problem of finding an NE in CS-TNGs and CON-TNGs is in PLS. For symmetric
TNGs, the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. For membership in PLS, we describe an algorithm to find an NE. Consider a TNG T , and let
N be the isomorphic NG with respect to B(T ). Recall that the size of N is polynomial in the size of
T . We run the PLS algorithm for finding an NE P in N . As in Theorem 5, the profile f−1(P ) is an
NE in T , thus we are done. When T is symmetric, so is N . Since finding an NE in a symmetric NG
can be done in polynomial time [25], the claim follows. J
For PLS-hardness, we describe a reduction from the problem of finding a local MAX CUT in a
weighted network (LMC, for short) which is known to be PLS-complete [40]. In [1], a polynomial-
time reduction is shown from the LMC problem to the problem of finding an NE in CON-NGs. The
reduction involves two steps: from the LMC problem to the problem of finding an NE in a class of
games called quadratic threshold games, which in turn is reduced to the problem of finding an NE in
a CON-NG. The reduction in [1] always produces an acyclic CON-NG. By Theorem 3, the latter can
be reduced to an isomorphic CON-TNG. In order to use a similar technique for CS-TNGs, we first
establish PLS-hardness for acyclic CS-NGs, which is an open problem. The proof uses a non-trivial
reduction from the LMC problem and can be found in the full version.
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I Theorem 15. The problem of finding an NE in acyclic CS-NGs is PLS-hard.
We thus have a matching lower bound also for CS-TNGs leading to the following theorem.
I Theorem 16. The problems of finding an NE in CS-TNGs and CON-TNGs are PLS-complete.
7 Discussion and Directions for Future Research
We introduced and studied timed network games, which are an extension of network games with
real-time considerations. TNGs are inspired by timed automata [5], which are automata extended by
a finite set of clocks. A clock is a variable that takes values in IR≥0 and whose values increase as time
passes. In the full version we study TNGs with clocks, in which, as in timed automata, transitions
are labeled by constraints on the clocks and clocks may be reset when traversing a transition. For
example, if we reset a clock x when we enter a vertex v, then a guard x ≤ 5 in a transition that leaves
v, bounds the time spent in v to be at most 5 time units. The TNGs we study here are equivalent to
a model with clocks that are never reset. Indeed, then, all clocks maintain the time that has passed
since the start of the game, and guards impose bounds on this time. TNGs with clocks are already
interesting in the degenerate case when there is only one player, a.k.a. priced timed automata (PTA,
for short) [7, 15].
We describe here briefly our results for TNGs with clocks. Clearly, the negative results we obtain
here for TNGs without clocks follow to the general setting. Recall that a main tool for obtaining
positive results is a reduction between TNGs and NGs. The key to such a reduction is a partition of
IR≥0 into finitely many intervals, which involves two questions: about the granularity to which we
have to partition IR≥0, and about the maximal point in time that is of interest. While the answer to the
first question is not difficult also for TNGs with clocks, the answer to the second question is difficult
and interesting in its own right. Our positive results are not obtained using such a reduction. In order
to prove the existence of an NE in every TNG with clocks, we show that such games are potential
games and we also find a lower bound on the decrease in potential in a best response. Note that only
showing that TNGs with clocks are potential games does not suffice to prove existence of an NE as
there are infinitely many profiles. We then turn to study computational-complexity problems and
show that the best-response problem is PSPACE-complete, which matches the complexity of cost
optimal reachability in PTAs [?]. Finally, we address the question above; namely, we find bounds on
the minimal time at which the players reach their destinations in an NE and an SO.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal
verification and algorithmic game theory: logics for specifying multi-agent systems [6, 20], studies
of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems [19, 18, 26, 4], and of non-zero-sum
games in formal verification [21, 17]. This line of work also includes an extension of NGs to objectives
that are richer than reachability [14], NGs in which the players select their paths dynamically [11],
and efficient reasoning about NGs with huge networks [33, 10].
Additional extensions of TNGs that we plan to study are the following: (1) Richer objectives,
where the vertices of the TNG are labeled by letters from an alphabet, allowing objectives that
describe on-going behaviors [14]. For example, an objective may require each visit to vertex labeled
send to be preceded by a vertex labeled encode. (2) A dynamic choice of paths, where strategies do
not specify the full path but rather map prefixes of paths of all players to the next move [11]. For
example, when the network models a network of roads and the players are drivers, it makes sense
to allow drivers to observe the congestion in the network when reaching a junction (vertex) before
choosing the next road (edge) in their path. (3) A global-cost mechanism, in which the load on a
resource refers to the total time for which it is used, rather than to particular time instants.
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